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Troubled Real Estate Leasing Companies Trapped 
Within the Personal Holding Company Income Tax 
Provisions 
The personal holding company provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code1 have many times proved to be a "snare for the 
~nwary ."~  The corporate taxpayer has often assumed that since 
it is not a passive investment company it is immune from the 
seventy-percent personal holding company tax.3 The expunging 
personal holding company tax provisions, however, have unfor- 
tunately swept within their reach certain types of operating real 
estate ~ompanies.~ 
In the recent case of Parkside, Inc. v. Commis~ioner,~ the 
president of Parkside and its sister corporation, both of whose 
assets consisted primarily of duplex homes, struggled for five 
years to profitably manage the corporations by renting the du- 
plexes."fter continual losses, he sold the duplexes separately 
through real estate agents. The sales eventually resulted in sub- 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "Code" or "Section(s)" refer to the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
The personal holding company provisions of the Code comprise I.R.C. # §  541-547. The 
Tax Court once termed these sections as an "irritatingly convoluted statutory path." 
Pleasanton Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 510, 516 (1975) (footnote omitted), aff'd 
per curiam, 578 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1978). 
2. Barsanti, A Snare for the Unwary: The Personal Holding Company Tax and Real 
Estate Holding Companies, 22 Mo. B.J. 112, 112 (1966). 
3. For an excellent discussion of operating technology companies that can be sub- 
jected to the personal holding company tax because of the royalties provision, (I.R.C. Ji 
543(b) (4)), see Morgan, The Domestic Technqlogy Base Company: The Dilemma of An 
Operating Company Which Might Be a Personal Holding Company, 33 TAX L. REV. 233 
( 1978). 
4. In Noteman v. Welch, 108 F.2d 206 (1st Cir. 1939), one of the first cases to narrate 
the personal holding company legislative history, the court noted, 
Id. 
It not infrequently happens that legislative bodies, with specific instances of 
abuse in mind, phrase tax legislation in such broad terms as to include persons 
or groups of persons not specifically contemplated. . . . In the present instance 
it was pointed out at the committee hearings that the term "personal holding 
company" was so broadly defined that legitimate operating companies might be 
subjected to its provisions. 
it 208 (footnote omitted). 
5. 571 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1977). 
6. Three brothers and a sister inherited the stock of Parkside in 1960 upon their 
father's death. Its principal assets consisted of 26 duplexes. Beaconcrest, the sister corpo- 
ration, was formed in 1960 to receive part of the assets from a corporation previously 
organized by the father. Beaconcrest's assets consisted primarily of 21 duplexes. Id. at 
1093. 
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stantial interest income from installment payments. The Com- 
missioner determined that since the corporations were not in the 
business of selling duplexes, the interest was ordinary interest 
and the corporations fell within the personal holding company 
provisions. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's judg- 
ment,' but on appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed.' Explicitly rely- 
ing on the capital asset criteria of section 1221(1),9 the court held 
that the corporations were primarily in the business of selling 
duplexes and hence the interest income should be classified as 
"rents" under section 543(b) (3). 
A brief outline of the mechanics of the personal holding com- 
pany provisions illustrates the difficulty of analyzing the applica- 
tion of the tax. Complex formulas and definitions1° provide that 
a corporation will be considered a personal holding company for 
tax purposes if: personal holding company incornell is at least 
7. Parkside, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M;(CCH) 54 (1975), reu'd, 571 F.2d 1092 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
8. 571 F.2d at 1096. 
9. The court briefly stated, "[Wle can divine no reason to construe the thrust of 
these passages differently. We will, therefore, turn to section 1221(1) cases for guidance." 
Id. at 1094 (footnote omitted). 
10. One commentator has ably stated: 
Even prior to the Revenue Act of 1964, the personal holding company provi- 
sions constituted a maze of complex definitions, percentage tests pyramided one 
on another, and exceptions phrased in statutory detail which defied understand- 
ing-even by tax experts. The 1964 Act has greatly magnified these difficulties 
by piecemeal tinkering designed to curb tax avoidance. Such tinkering not only 
has complicated the provisions to a much greater degree by departing from 
familiar accounting standards, but it has also created a serious risk of imposing 
this severe penalty on active business operations. 
Nolan, Personal Holding Companies Under the 1e Act: A Maze of Arbitrary Standards, 
1965 TUL. TAX INST. 171, 171 (footnote omitted). 
The Tax Court has also referred to these sections as "exasperatingly complex statu- 
tory provisions." Bell Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 766, 775, aff'd mem., 546 
F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1976). 
11. The applicable portions of I.R.C. 8 543(a), defining personal holding company 
income, provide: 
(a) GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "personal 
holding company income" means the portion of the adjusted ordinary gross 
income which consists of: 
(1) DIVIDENDS, ETC.-Dividends, interest, royalties . . . and 
annuities. This paragraph shall not apply to- 
(A) interest constituting rent (as defined in subsection 
W(3)) . . . . 
. . . .  
(2) -.-The adjusted income from rents; except that such ad- 
justed income shall not be included if- 
(A) such adjusted income constitutes 50 percent or more 
of the adjusted ordinary gross income, and 
(B) the sum of- 
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sixty percent of the adjusted ordinary gross income,12 and not 
more than five individuals own directly or indirectly more than 
fifty percent of the outstanding stock.13 Interest on a debt for real 
(i) the dividends paid during the taxable year . . . , 
(ii) the dividends considered as paid on the last day 
of the taxable year . . . , and 
(iii) the consent dividends for the taxable year . . . , 
equals or exceeds the amount, if any, by which the personal holding company 
income for the taxable year (computed without regard to this paragraph and 
paragraph (6), and computed by including as personal holding company income 
copyright royalties and the adjusted income from mineral, oil, and gas royalties) 
exceeds 10 percent of the ordinary gross income. 
Also included in the definition of personal holding company income in paragraphs (3) 
through (8) of subsection (a) of 9 543 are: mineral, oil, and gas royalties; copyright royal- 
ties; produced film rents; compensation for corporate property used by shareholders; 
personal service contracts; and estates, trusts, and beneficiaries. 
12. Ordinary gross income, adjusted ordinary gross income, and adjusted income 
from rents are defined in I.R.C. 9 543(b): 
(1) ORDINARY GROSS INCOME.-T~~ term "ordinary gross income" means 
the gross income determined by excluding- 
(A) all gains from the sale or other disposition of capital assets, 
(B) all gains (other than those referred to in subparagraph (A)) 
from the sale or other disposition of property described in section 
1231(b) . . . 
. . . .  
(2) ADJUSTED ORDINARY GROSS INCOME.--T~~ term "adjusted ordinary gross 
income" means the ordinary gross income adjusted as follows: 
(A) RENTS.-From the gross income from rents (as defined in 
the second sentence of paragraph (3) of this subsection) subtract the 
amount allowable as deductions for- 
(i) exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, and amorti- 
zation of property other than tangible personal property which 
is not customarily retained by any one lessee for more than 
three years, 
(ii) property taxes, 
(iii) interest, and 
(iv) rent, 
to the extent allocable, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, 
to such gross income from rents. . . . 
. . . . 
(3) ADJUSTED INCOME FROM RENTS.-T~~ term "adjusted income from 
rents" means the gross income from rents, reduced by the amount subtracted 
under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection. For purposes of the preceding sen- 
tence, the term "rents" means compensation, however designated, for the use 
of, or right to use, property, and the interest on debts owed to the corporation, 
to the extent such debts represent the price for which real property held primar- 
ily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business was sold 
or exchanged by the corporation . . . . 
13. The two basic requirements are listed in I.R.C. § 542(a): 
(a) GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "personal holding com- 
pany" means any corporation (other than a corporation described in subsection (c)) if- 
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estate may be characterized as either ordinary interest or, if the 
real estate is held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary 
course of trade or business, as rents." While ordinary interest is 
always included in personal holding company income, rents may 
be excluded from personal holding company income if the ad- 
justed income from rents is more than fifty percent of the ad- 
justed ordinary gross income. Therefore, if a real estate com- 
pany's only income is considered ordinary interest, a personal 
holding company will result.15 On the other hand, if the interest 
can be classified as rents under section 543(b)(3) the company 
will not be treated as a personal holding company.16 
This Comment discusses three alternative methods of apply- 
ing section 543(b) (3). The Tax Court's opinion in Parkside illus- 
trates a mechanical approach-a strict statutory construction 
without regard to corporate intentions-a position that has often 
been taken by courts in determining personal holding company 
status. The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court in Parkside, 
used a second alternative by employing section 1221(1) criteria to 
(1) ADJUSTED ORDINARY GROSS INCOME REQUIREMENT.-At least 60 percent of 
its adjusted ordinary gross income (as defined in section 543(b)(2)) for the 
taxable year is personal holding company income (as defined in section 543(a)), 
and 
(2) STOCK OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT.-At any time during the last half of 
the taxable year more than 50 percent in value of its outstanding stock is owned, 
directly or indirectly, by or for not more than 5 individuals. 
14. See I.R.C. 8 543(a)(1), (b)(3). 
15. For purposes of this Comment, a brief equation summary of the interest calcula- 
tion can be made: 
Personal Holding Company Income (PHCI) = 
(1) dividends, interest, royalties, annuities, and 
(2) rents, unless the adjusted income from rents 2 50% of the ad- 
justed ordinary gross income, and the dividends for the year > the 
amount by which dher  passive income exceeds 10% of the ordinary 
gross income. 
Adjusted Ordinary Gross Income (AOGI) = Gross Income less: 
(1) capital gains and 8 1231(b) gains, and 
(2) depreciation, property taxes, etc., allocable to rents. 
If the stock ownership requirement is met, a corporation's status as a personal holding 
company will depend upon whether or not PHCVAOGI 260%. Assuming that the corpora- 
tion's groas income consists entirely of interest income from real estate and that there are 
no applicable adjustments in arriving a t  AOGI, gross income = AOGI. If the interest is 
considered ordinary interest it is classified as PHCI. Thus, PHCVAOGI = 100% and the 
corporation is a personal holding company. 
16. Assuming again that interest income is the corporation's only income, the classifi- 
cation of the interest as rents removes it from the personal holding company income 
classification because the rents, being equal to AOGI, exceed 50% of AOGI. Therefore, 
PHCI = 0 and PHCVAOGI = 0%. The corporation is not considered a personal holding 
company. 
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interpret section 543(b)(3). This Comment suggests a third alter- 
native-a revision of section 543(b) (3). 
Such a revision would better achieve the purposes for which 
the section was originally intended and would provide a safeguard 
against the inappropriate application of the personal holding 
company tax to real estate leasing companies forced to divest. 
II. LEGISLATIVE D VELOPMENT OF PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY 
PROVISIONS 
A. Early Attempts to Reach Tax Avoidance Corporations 
Since the early revenue statutes enacted at the close of the 
Civil War," Congress has employed various measures in an at- 
tempt to tax wealthy individuals who permit their income to 
accumulate in a corporation instead of receiving it personally. 
During the early part of this century, wealthy individuals ex- 
ploited the use of this tax avoidance device because the flat cor- 
porate tax rates were lower than the high levels of the graduated 
tax on individual income.18 
The sixteenth amendment, passed in 1913, empowered Con- 
gress to tax income "from whatever source derived."19 The first 
revenue act passed subsequent to this amendment allowed taxa- 
tion of income to the shareholders of a corporation whether or not 
corporate income accumulated by the corporation was distrib- 
uted to the  shareholder^.^^ This practice continued until 1920, 
when the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner v. Macom ber2I cast 
serious constitutional doubt upon the validity of taxing undis- 
tributed corporate income to shareholders. Consequently, section 
220 of the Revenue Act of 1921 omitted this provision and instead 
taxed surplus accumulated to avoid the surtax on individual in- 
come. 22 
Under section 220 of the Revenue Act of 1921, use of a hold- 
ing company was prima facie evidence of a design to escape the 
tax on  individual^.^^ This presumption could be rebutted, how- 
ever, by proving the accumulation was reasonable in view of cor- 
17. E.g., Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, O II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 
4 2, 13 Stat. 223 as amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469. 
18. See Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528,530 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 1860,75th 
Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1938). 
19. U S .  CONST. amend XVI. 
20. Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, 5 II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114. 
21. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
22. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, @ 220, 42 Stat. 227. 
23. Id. 
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porate needs? Subsequent personal holding company provisions 
have retained two aspects of section 220: (1) an additional pen- 
alty tax above normal tax rates for corporations, and (2) a tax on 
holding companies employed to avoid the individual tax? 
Section 220, however, was insufficient to inhibit the diver- 
sion of personal income from wealthy individuals to various incor- 
porated devices, commonly known as incorporated pocketbooks, 
incorporated yachts, incorporated talents, or incorporated coun- 
try estates? The basic scheme of these devices, later called per- 
sonal holding companies, was explained by Congressman Dough- 
ton: 
[A] number of wealthy individuals have organized personal 
holding companies and have transferred to such companies their 
houses, yachts, or other property used for their purely personal 
enjoyment, along with sufficient income-producing assets to 
produce enough revenue to pay the running expenses of such 
property. To proviae a background of reality for this obviously 
fictitious transaction the stockholder pays his holding company 
a normal rental for the use of such estate or yacht.27 
As the Commissioner could not always prove that these in- 
corporated devices were unreasonably accumulating income for 
evasion of individual income taxes, the need to effectively elimi- 
nate this tax avoidance instrument became apparent to Con- 
gress." Accordingly, the House of Representatives, in 1928, pro- 
posed separate tax provisions for personal holding companies. 
The proposal defined personal holding companies as corporations 
whose income from royalties, dividends, rents, interest, annui- 
ties, or sales of securities amounted to more than eighty percent 
of the annual corporate income and whose stock was owned di- 
rectly or indirectly by ten or fewer  individual^.^^ The Senate re- 
jected this detailed definition as arbitrary because corporations 
tha t  appeared to unreasonably accumulate earnings could be 
penalized even though in actuality they were appropriately build- 
24. Subsequent case law interpreted "prima facie evidence" as presumptive evi- 
dence. See United States v. R.C. Tway Coal Sales Co., 75 F.2d 336, 337 (6th Cir. 1935). 
This provision exists in the current Code and has been termed a "rebuttable presumption" 
by the Supreme Court. Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 628 (1975). 
25. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, Q 220, 42 Stat. 227. 
26. See B. BIT~KER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 1 8.20 (1971 ed.). 
27. 81 CONG. REG. 9019 (1937). 
28. See American Package Corp. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 413,416 (4th Cir. 1942); 
Federal Legislation, The 1937 "Tax Loophole" Act: Purpose (pt. I) ,  26 GEO. L.J. 380,392- 
93 ( 1937). 
29. H.R. REP. NO. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1928). 
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ing a surplus for later business necessities." Since receipts from 
federal taxes and tariffs exceeded government expenditures dur- 
ing this period, the Senate may not have sensed a need for stricter 
tax legi~lation.~' 
B. Statutory Enactment 
1. The Revenue Act of 1934 
There was a drastic change in the fiscal conditions of the 
country between 1928 and 1934; the Great Depression stunned 
the country. Emergency expenditures by the federal government 
to subsidize employment programs and stimulate the economy 
caused large deficits in the federal accounts.32 Accordingly, the 
Revenue Act of 1934 was designed to increase revenues by pre- 
venting tax avoidance.33 
One of the tax evasion devices that Congress most desired to 
eliminate was the domestic personal holding companyY Congress 
considered the incorporated pocketbook to be the most prevalent 
form of tax avoidan~e .~~ Since the individuals employing these 
schemes were usually in the best position to pay the most taxes, 
Congress was particularly motivated to curb this tax avoidance 
device. 
The 1934 House proposal for meeting this need paralleled its 
suggested 1928 personal holding company provisions. The Senate 
30. S. REP. NO. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1928). 
31. The surplus accumulated by the Treasury Department was reported accordingly: 
Year Surplus (in millions) 
$309 
505 
250 
377 
635 
455 (estimated) 
274 (estimated) 
See H.R. REP. NO. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1928). 
32. The government had a large increase in emergency expenditures during the years 
of the depression. The deficit for the fiscal year 1933 was $2.6 billion, and in 1934 the 
estimated deficits for 1934 and 1935 (exclusive of debt retirement) were $7.3 billion and 
$1.99 billion, respectively. See S. ReP. NO. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1934); H.R RBP. 
No. 704 ( pt . I), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). It  is therefore apparent why the Congress of 
1934 was concerned over any reputed form of tax avoidance. 
33. H.R. REP. NO. 704 (pt. I), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). 
34. Id. at 11-12. 
35. Id. 
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accepted the House proposal with one important exception. The 
House had included rents as part of personal holding company 
income, but the Senate, fearing actively operating family real 
estate businesses would be classified as personal holding compa- 
nies, excluded rents from personal holding company income? 
Unlike the 1921 provisions taxing accumulated earnings, the 
personal holding company tax did not permit a company to prove 
that its retention of surplus earnings was reasonable in light of 
business nece~sities.~' Indeed, the personal holding company pro- 
visions were meant to work "automatically" because Congress in 
1934 believed that the tax would only reach corporations formed 
for the sole purpose of avoiding the surtax.38 
2. The Revenue Act of 1937 
The Senate's desire to protect bona fide operating real estate 
companies apparently did not enjoy continued support after Pres- 
ident Franklin D. Robsevelt made a emphatic speech condemning 
tax avoidance through personal holding companies." Because it 
was believed that personal holding companies were using mini- 
mal amounts of rental income to cover substantial passive invest- 
ment income, personal holding company income was expanded to 
include rents? Based on the arbitrary assumption that the rental 
income of "bona-fide and legitimate operating companies" would 
36. The Senate report stated, 
While agreeing with the general method proposed in the House bill to remedy 
this situation, i t  is believed that section 102 of the House bill, dealing with 
personal holding companies imposes a heavy penalty on many companies which 
do not properly fall into the classification of the "incorporated pocketbook." 
. . , 
A great part of the real-estate business is done by small family corporations. 
These partake more of the nature of operating companies than mere holding 
companies. Your committee is of the opinion that it is unwise to include such 
companies within the category of personal-holding companies. Therefore, the 
word "rents" is omitted from the definition. . . . 
. . . . 
The fact that some companies, such as real estate companies, have been 
placed outside the scope of this provision does not result in a serious opportunity 
for tax avoidance. Such companies, and, in fact, all other corporations, are still 
subject to section 102 [the accumulated earnings provision] of the bill. 
S. REP. NO. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1934). 
37. One court stated Congress was attempting to foreclose the accumulated earnings 
defense that the funds were legitimately accumulated. O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Commis- 
sioner, 120 F.2d 845, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1941). See also Federal Legislation, supra note 28, a t  
392-93. 
38. H.R. REP. NO. 704 (pt. I) ,  73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). 
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). 
40. Id. a t  6. 
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not be less than fifty percent of the gross income, rental income 
was excluded from personal holding company income only if it 
surpasssed fifty percent of the company's gross incomee41 
This revenue Act marked one of the first congressional at- 
tempts to distinguish active from passive income in an industry 
in which Congress recognized that both active and passive busi- 
nesses could exist. The vague concept of passive income is gener- 
ally understood to include dividends, annuities, interest, royal- 
ties, rents, and income from sales of stock and se~ur i t i es .~~  Passive 
income is considered to be derived from passive investments re- 
quiring little or no management.43 Active income includes other 
types of income requiring active operation and management. 
There are exceptions to this general statement, some of which 
Congress has statutorily recognized. For example, the receipt of 
interest from a small number of loans may represent passive in- 
come to a creditor, while numerous loans may produce the major 
source of income for a finance or lending company.44 A single 
piece of rented or leased property may require little or no atten- 
tion of a corporate owner and may represent only a side invest- 
ment, but a large apartment complex may represent an active 
operating company and may require the constant efforts of nu- 
merous employees to generate profits." Thus, protecting the ac- 
tive operating real estate business has presented a difficult prob- 
lem to Congress since an active business may, due to statutory 
imprecision, earn what is considered passive income. 
3. The Revenue Act of 1938 
The language now incorporated in section 543(b)(3), refer- 
ring to interest on debts from real estate held primarily for sale 
to customers in the ordinary course of business, originated with 
the Revenue Act of 1938.46 The accompanying House Report ex- 
plained the change: 
In order to relieve from the surtax imposed by Title IA of 
the bill certain operating companies whose principal business 
- - - -- - -- 
41. Id. 
42. See Bates v. United States, 581 F.2d 575, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1978); I.R.C. 4 
1372(e)(5)(C). 
43. See Rohida v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1972). 
44. A lending or finance company is exempted from personal holding company status 
under I.R.C. 6 542(C)(6), which is further limited by I.R.C. § 542(d). 
45. Real estate companies with largely rental income are exempted from personal 
holding company status through the adjustments in I.R.C. §§ 542(a)(2) and 543(b)(3). 
46. Compare Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 5 403(g), 52 Stat. 447 (now I.R.C. JI 
543(h)(3)) with Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 351, 49 Stat. 1648. 
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consists in the development of real estate for sale, section 403 
makes a change in the treatment of certain types of interest 
. . . . This change will help those bona fide real estate operat- 
ing companies which might otherwise find themselves subject to 
the tax under Title IA of the bill in years in which, by reason of 
an inactive market for the sale of real estate, the greater part of 
their income is derived from interest on second mortgages on 
property previously sold by them and from rent from property 
leased pending its sale and the rents in themselves do not consti- 
tute 50 percent or more of gross income. Under the proposed 
definition of "rents", such companies will not be classified as 
personal holding companies.47 
Evidently Congress did not contemplate the dilemma of a 
real estate leasing company forced to sell its properties because 
of an "inactive market." The House report does identify two 
types of "bona fide real estate operating companies which might 
otherwise find themselves subject to the tax": first, those "whose 
principal business consists in the development of real estate for 
sale," and second, those who receive rents from "property leased 
pending its sale [when] the rents in themselves do not constitute 
50 percent or more of gross income." Neither of these descriptions 
adequately provides protection for the financially troubled real 
estate leasing company. Perhaps Congress did not foresee that a 
bona fide real estate leasing company could, upon sale of its 
properties, find itself subject to the tax. It is also possible that 
Congress intended to exempt real estate leasing companies forced 
to liquidate from personal holding company status. At the time 
such companies decide to sell their real estate, it could be consid- 
ered as "property leased pending its sale." 
Upon enacting the predecessor to section 543(b)(3), Congress 
apparently anticipated the possibility that a recessive market 
might cause an otherwise active company to be classified as a 
personal holding company. Congress, however, did not foresee 
and provide for all the situations in which a personal holding 
company would result from market fluctuations. 
C.  Subsequent Development-Numerous Exceptions 
The language used in the Revenue Act of 1938 to qualify 
certain interest on real estate debts as rents was incorporated in 
subsequent acts and codes without substantial change.lThere 
47. H.R. REP. NO. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 51 (1938). 
48. Compare Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, fi 403(g), 52 Stat. 447 (now 'I.R.C. 4 
543(b)(3)) with Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, fi 502(g), 53 Stat. 1 and I.R.C. SI 543(b)(3). 
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have been numerous refinements, however, in other provisions of 
the personal holding company tax designed to avoid taxing active 
companies not within the original congressional intent. The Reve- 
nue Act of 1934 recognized an exception for banks, life insurance 
companies, and surety companies, even though these institutions 
acquired income that could technically be classified as passive so 
as to otherwise invoke the personal holding company  provision^.^^ 
Furthermore, one critic recently noted a procession of a t  least 
eighteen supplicants from various industries and businesses that 
have been granted relief from the overly broad personal holding 
company  provision^.^^ He concluded this "endless parade" indi- 
cates "[tlhe personal holding company tax, despite the intent of 
Congress, is fundamentally defective in failing adequately to 
shield active businesses from its impa~t."~'  
49. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 4 351(b)(l), 48 Stat. 680. Concerning the present 
major statutory exemptions, one treatise comments: 
Generically, these exempted corporations are corporations which receive per- 
sonal holding company income but are not considered to be within the concept 
of incorporated pocketbooks because they receive such income as a result of 
carrying on an active trade or business. Corporations exempted on this basis 
include banks, life insurance companies, surety companies, certain lending and 
finance companies, and federally licensed small business investment compa- 
nies. 
T. NESS & E. VOGEL, TAXATION F THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION 4 6.1(a) (3d ed. 1976) 
(footnote omitted). 
fiO. Mr. Morgan has written: 
From the inception of the personal holding company tax, banks, life insur- 
ance companies and surety companies were also recognized as active businesses, 
and were excluded from the personal holding company provisions. Thereafter, 
a steady procession of supplicants has been granted relief by Congress for com- 
parable reasons: holders of mineral oil or gas royalties (in 1937), licensed per- 
sonal finance companies (in 1938), affiliated groups of railroad corporations (in 
1938), industrial banks and Morris Plan companies (in 1942), other small loan 
companies and financing companies (in 1950), corporations renting property to 
shareholders for use in an active commercial, industrial or mining enterprise (in 
1950, retroactive to l945), domestic building and loan associations (l95l), ship- 
ping enterprises depositing amounts in Merchant Marine Act reserves (in 1954), 
corporate affiliated groups generally (in 1954), corporations renting property to 
shareholders but not having other significant personal holding company income 
(in 1954), small business investment companies (in 1959), music publishers (in 
1960), movie producers (in 1964 and again in 1976), securities dealers handling 
U.S. government bonds (in 1964), manufacturers leasing their products and also 
realizing related royalty income (1964 and again in 1966), corporate affiliated 
groups with life insurance subsidiaries (in 1974), and franchisors [sic] leasing 
the franchise and other property to shareholders for use in an active business 
(in 1976). Congress, in aiding those afflicted, has repeatedly expressed the inten- 
tion to keep active businesses out of personal holding company entanglements. 
Morgan, supra note 3, at 241-44 (footnotes omitted). 
51. Id. at 244. 
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A. The Mechanical Approach to Personal Holding Company 
Determination 
Personal holding company provisions have been mechani- 
cally applied against the taxpayer without concern for harsh re- 
s u l t ~ . ~ ~  This mechanical approach is reflected in the Tax Court's 
decision in Parkside, Inc. u. Cornrni~sioner.~~ Relying on legisla- 
tive history, the court pointed out that the statute was intended 
to exempt only "bona fide real estate operating companies" and 
was "strictly mechanical9'-applying without regard to corporate 
intention~.~The court implied the corporations could not be con- 
sidered bona fide real estate operating companies because the 
corporations were "merely leasing companie~."~~ No explanation 
was given to indicate why leasing companies could not be consid- 
ered bona fide real estate operating companies. The distinction 
may have been trivial, yet the unexplained conclusion resulted in 
a stiff seventy-percent tax. 
In another case that arguably could have been decided for 
the taxpayer, the Tax Court held that a company formed to buy 
property for resale to others on easier terms did not fall within 
section 543(b)(3) since the property was not technically held pri- 
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. 
Thus, the receipt of interest from these sales resulted in the com- 
pany being considered a personal holding company.J6 
52. The Tax Court has stated that since the statute is designed to correct the serious 
evil of the incorporated pocketbook, it  must be strictly construed. Kurt Frings Agency, 
Inc., 42 T.C. 472 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 351 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1965). See 320 E. 47th 
St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1957); O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. 
Commissioner, 120 F.2d 845, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1941); Bell Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 
65 T.C. 766, 775, aff'd mern., 546 F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1976); Darrow v. Commissioner, 64 
T.C. 217, 221-22 (1975). 
Justification for applying the tax automatically is found in the language of the 1934 
House report which removed the Commissioner's burden of proving there was a purpose 
to avoid surtaxes on individual income. H.R. REP. No. 704 (pt. I), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 
(1934). An addendum to the report, entitled "Additional Views of James A. Frear," leaves 
little doubt there was stiff opposition to the passage of this entire bill. It  was passed 
without public hearings and was formulated by a small group of tax experts who differed 
radically in their opinions. It was also reported that the Treasury "unqualifiedly differed" 
with the personal holding company provisions proposed. Id. a t  43. 
53. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 54 (1973), rev'd, 571 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1977). 
54. Id. at 61. 
55. Id. 
-56. Sieh v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1386 (1971), aff'd mem., 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-694 (8th 
Cir. 1973). 
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Although Congress apparently intended that the personal 
holding company tax be levied in an automatic fashion, courts 
have seldom noted Congress' subsequent interest in protecting 
active corporations. Congress' intent to protect active companies 
has not been broadly stated, but is nonetheless clearly evident in 
most of the personal holding company provisions enacted since 
1937. The numerous exceptions included in these provisions rep- 
resent a response to the cry of active companies caught in the 
personal holding company trap. Indeed, the provisions for exclud- 
ing rents when they constitute more than fifty percent of the 
adjusted ordinary gross income was based on the premise that 
active companies would thereby be pr~tected.~' 
B. Application of Section 1221 Criteria 
Since the language of section 1221(1)58 is similar to the lan- 
guage of section 543(b)(3), some courts have looked to section 
1221(1) cases for guidance." The Ninth Circuit in Parkside, how- 
57. H.R. REP. NO. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937). 
58. Under (i 1221 of the current Code all properties are considered capital assets with 
certain listed exceptions. Among the listed exceptions is "property held by the taxpayer 
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." I.R.C. § 
1221(1). Since the gains on capital assets are taxed at  a lesser rate than ordinary gains, 
taxpayers normally urge the courts to construe the capital asset exceptions narrowly. The 
statutory capital gains provisions for corporations are codified a t  I.R.C. § 1201(a), while 
the provisions applicable to individuals are codified in I.R.C. $ 8  120l(b) and 1202. Prior 
to the Revenue Act of 1924 the capital asset definition of § 1221(1) did not exclude 
property "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of 
his trade or business." See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227. Assets 
constituting inventory were implicitly distinguished from capital assets because they were 
sold to customers in the ordinary course of business. At that time, however, real property 
held for sale to customers was not considered inventory and could thus be classified as a 
capital asset. See Helen M. Dunigan, 23 B.T.A. 418 (1931), aff'd, 66 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 
1933); Gilbert S. Wright, 22 B.T.A. 1045 (1931); Albert F. Keeney; 17 B.T.A. 560 (1929). 
Legislative provisions were added in 1924 to constrict the capital asset definition and 
exclude as a capital asset real estate held primarily for sale in the course of business. 
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 6 208(a)(8), 43 Stat. 253. This was intended to prevent tax 
avoidance and add greater clarity to the classes of property excluded from the capital asset 
definition. S. REP. NO. 398, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 122 (1924). In 1934, the words "to 
customers" and "ordinary" were added to the definition. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 
117(b), 48 Stat. 680. Since 1934, similar language has been found in each major revenue 
act and Code. Compare I.R.C. 8 1221(1) with Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, 6 117(a)(l), 
53 Stat. 1; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 5 117(a)(l), 52 Stat. 447; and Revenue Act of 
1936, ch. 690, 8117(b), 49 Stat. 1648. 
59. See Kent Indus. Corp., 25 T.C. 215, 219 (1955); Webster Corp., 25 T.C. 55, 60 
(1955), aff'd per curium, 240 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1957); Frederick Smith Enterprise Co., 6 
T.C.M. (CCH) 595, 599 (1947), aff'd, 167 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1948). 
Other courts construing 4 543(b)(3) have summarily found that the property was not 
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business with little analysis 
or reliance on other cases. See Sieh v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1386, 1390 (1971), aff'd 
mem., 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-694 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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ever, appears to be the first federal appellate court to explicitly 
apply the section 1221(1) criteria to section 543(b)(3) without 
m~dification.~" 
The Parkside case demonstrates how section 1221(1) criteria 
can be applied to section 543 to provide a needed avenue of relief 
for companies that have unwittingly stumbled into the personal 
holding company provisions. The court stated that since the lan- 
guage of section 1221(1) was similar to section 543(b)(3), section 
1221(1) criteria could be adopted. The section 1221(1) criteria 
used by the court were 
"the length of holding of the property, the nature of the acquisi- 
tion of the property, the frequency and continuity of sales over 
an extended period of time, the nature and the extent of the 
taxpayer's business, the activity of the seller about the property, 
and the extent and substantiality of the  transaction^."^^ 
Without indicating whether its analyisis was based entirely on 
the foregoing factors, the court discussed other "indicia" that 
were "sufficiently compelling to sway the balance" in favor of 
Parkside and its sister c~rporation.'~ The court concluded the 
taxpayers were in the business of selling duplexes and found the 
Tax Court "clearly in error."" The Parkside opinion did not refer 
to the legislative history of section 543(b) (3) although most courts 
do so when determining personal holding company status.R4 
While the Ninth Circuit conveniently circumvented the 
harsh legislative intentions documented in the 1930's" and was 
60. 571 F.2d a t  1094. 
61. Id. a t  1096 (quoting Los Angeles Extension Co. v. United States, 315 F.2d 1, 3 
(9th Cir. 1963)). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528,530-31 (1978); Commissioner v. Lane- 
Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 221 (1944); Doehring v. Commissioner, 527 F.2d 945, 947 (8th 
Cir. 1975); Bayou Verret Land Co. v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 850, 853-54 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Hilldun Corp. v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1969); Frelbro Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 315 F.2d 784, 788 (2d Cir. 1963); 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 
243 F.2d 894, 897-98 (2d Cir. 1957); Frederick Smith Enterprise Co. v. Commissioner, 167 
F.2d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 1948); O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 845, 847- 
49 (2d Cir. 1941); Noteman v. Welch, 108 F.2d 206, 208-10 (1st Cir. 1939); Irving Berlin 
Music Corp. v. United States, 487 F.2d 540, 547-48 (Ct. C1. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S .  
832 (1974); Fidelity Commercial Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 483, 489 (1970), aff'd 
mem., 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5751 (4th Cir. 1971); Callan v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1514, 1519 
(1970), aff 'd per curiam, 476 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1973); Jos. K., Inc., 51 T.C. 584, 596-98 
(1969); Coshocton Secs. Co., 26 T.C. 935,939 (1956); Kent Indus. Corp. 25 T.C. 215, 218- 
19 (1955). 
65. One court recognized the unfortunate results of this legislative period when the 
facts of the case caused a company to fall within the personal holding company trap. "It 
is true that the result in this particular case is undoubtedly a hardship such as Congress 
994 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I978 
able to successfully rescue a troubled company from the personal 
holding company trap, it is doubtful whether section 1221(1) cri- 
teria can be relied upon in the future to resolve section 543(b)(3) 
questions. Although extensive litigation involving section 1221 (1) 
has identified numerous criteria for determining whether prop- 
erty is held as a capital asset, it is difficult to distill clear and 
consistently applied criteria." One court in apparent exaspera- 
tion with this subsection stated, "Finding ourselves engulfed in 
a fog of decisions with gossamer like distinctions, and a quagmire 
of unworkable, unreliable, and often irrelevant tests, we take the 
route of ad hoc exploration to find ordinary in~ome."'~ One com- 
mentator bemoaned the fact that "any attempt to reconcile the 
cases in this area would likely produce nothing more than an 
exercise in futility."" Reconciliation of section 1221(1) criteria is 
not within the scope of this Comment; rather, the effect of apply- 
ing the criteria from this ambiguous section of the Code to section 
543(b) (3) is considered. 
may not have had in mind in enacting the statute. However, it is the type of hardship 
which sometimes follows an attempt to remedy a serious evil by drastic measures. "Cedar- 
burg Canning Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1945) (emphasis added). 
One author has noted that the "New Dealers" had a "political passion" to eliminate 
holding companies because of the expansive control they often maintained over the econ- 
omy. See Schaffer, The Income Tax on Intercorporate Dividends 6 (June 7, 1978) (unpub- 
lished report prepared for the American Bar Association, Section of Taxation: Committee 
on Affiliated and Related Corporations). 
66. In speaking of the capital gains definition, which is dependent upon the capital 
asset definition in I.R.C. 8 1221, one commentator has noted: 
The income tax provisions of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code represent. 
probably the most complex revenue law ever enacted in the fiscal history of any 
country. The subject singly responsible for the largest amount of complexity is 
the treatment of capital gains and losses. And the factor in that treatment which 
is accountable for the resulting complexity is the definition of capital gain and 
of capital loss. 
Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 985, 
( 1956). 
For examples of courts struggling with the capital gains definition in the sale of land, 
see Malat v. Riddell, 383 U S .  569 (1966); Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 
F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1977); International Shoe Mach. Corp. 
v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1974); Goodman v. United States, 390 F.2d 915 
(Ct. C1. 1968); S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295 (1966). For a discussion of factors affecting courts 
in their analysis of capital gains in land sales, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, DISCUSSION 
DRAFT OF A STUDY OF DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 21-27, 33-35, 61, 
71 -72, 92-96 (1960); P. ANDERSON, TAX FACTORS IN REAL ESTATE OPERATIONS 1-7 (1973); J. 
HIC&MS, THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE SALE OF LAND 1-7 (1973); 3B J. MERTENS, THE 
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4 4  22.15, .138-.142, .144, .I45 (rev. ed. 1973). 
67. United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 906 (5th Cir. 1969). 
68. Libin, "Transactions Entered into for Profit," "Regular Trade or Business," 
andlor "Investment ": Some Distinctions and Differences, 27 N.Y. INST. FED. TAX. 1209, 
1213 (1969). 
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Application of section 1221(1) criteria to section 543(b)(3) 
can be advantageous to the taxpayer. The ambiguity and flexibil- 
ity of section 1221(1) can be employed by courts to temper the 
mechanical application of the personal holding company tax. 
Indeed, the flexibility of section 1221(1) may represent the judi- 
cial answer to the plight of uncautious corporations caught within 
the snare of the personal holding company provisions. 
In Parkside both the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court relied 
upon section 1221(1) cases to analyze the application of section 
543(b) (3). For example, when both courts considered the fact that 
the sales had actually occurred during a liquidation of assets, 
both cited cases determined under section 1221(1)." The Tax 
Court found insufficient sales activity for Parkside to be consid- 
ered a dealer or in the business of selling real e~tate.~VJ?he Ninth 
Circuit, however, held that these sales in the course of a liquida- 
tion involved property technically held for sale in the ordinary 
course of bu~iness.~' The ambiguity of section 1221(1) often causes 
contrary results in similar transactions because, as the Ninth 
Circuit stated, "In the final analysis, each case must be decided 
upon its own'fa~ts ."~~ 
The flexibility' of section 1221(1) is further demonstrated by 
contrasting Parkside with Heller Trust v. Commis~ioner.~:~ In 
Heller Trust, the taxpayer had built and rented duplexes that 
after a few years proved unprofitable. The duplexes were subse- 
quently advertised and sold by independent agents. Although the 
taxpayer sold his 169 duplexes over a three-year period, he 
claimed the profits were entitled to capital gains treatment be- 
cause they resulted from liquidation of investment property and 
not a sales business. The court agreed and decided that the du- 
plexes were held as an investment until just prior to the time of 
sale. Gain from a sale prompted by liquidation of investment 
property was classified as a capital gain because the property was 
not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of 
business. Even though Heller Trust and Parkside involved simi- 
lar factual circumstances, the Ninth Circuit was able to reach 
opposite conclusions by construing the flexible criteria of section 
1221 (1) differently. 
Thus, courts that apply section 1221(1) to section 543(b) (3) 
may be able to grant relief to unwary corporations that have 
69. See 571 F.2d at 1096; 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 59-60. 
70. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 59-60. 
71. 571 F.2d at 1096. 
72. Id. 
73. 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967). 
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stumbled into the personal holding company provisions. How- 
ever, the danger always exists that the flexibility and ambiguity 
of section 1221(1) may be used to defeat the valid claims of the 
taxpayer .74 
Applying section 1221(1) criteria to section 543(b)(3) may 
present serious problems for the corporation attempting to plan 
its activities in order to avoid the personal holding company tax. 
A company should be able to ascertain with reasonable certainty 
whether it will become subject to a seventy-percent tax. Because 
of the uncertain future provided by section 1221(1), the company 
may choose to cease operations and terminate employees, thereby 
depriving the community of any benefits otherwise provided. 
In addition, both the object and focus of section 1221(1) are 
different than those of section 543(b)(3). Substitution of one sec- 
tion's interpretation for the other may be inappropriate. Section 
1221(1) was incorporated into the Code to prevent tax avoidance 
by constricting the advantageous capital gain treatment to a lim- 
ited category of assets. Section 1221 focuses on the character of 
the asset and seeks to provide favorable treatment to gains that 
accrue due to the passage of time.'The section 543(b)(3) excep- 
tion to personal holding company income, however, was designed 
to broaden the category of corporations exempt from personal 
holding company status by providing relief to certain real estate 
businesses that would otherwise be classified as personal holding 
companies. This provision focuses on the character of the corpo- 
ration and the type of income earned.76 Finally, because section 
74. Another disadvantage for taxpayers when 6 1221(1) is used to interpret !I 
543(b)(3) is that taxpayers may tend to make inconsistent reports on their returns. Large 
gains from property may inadvertently be reported as capital gains. By claiming capital 
gain rates on their tax returns, taxpayers may be precluded from later denying capital 
asset status. See In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398, 1402 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975); Maletis v. United 
States, 200 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1952). Thus, the taxpayer will be forced, because of the 
similar language currently used in the two sections, to admit the property was not held 
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. 
In an unusual fashion, Parkside had reported its duplexes as ft 1231(b)(2)(B) property 
(property not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or 
business), which would have qualified for capital gains treatment. However, it had paid 
the normal tax rate. The Ninth Circuit noted a "disquieting inconsistency" in the Com- 
missioner's assertion that Parkside could not later deny the ft 1231(b)(2)(B) reporting, 
while the Commissioner had not previously refunded the excess tax. The court sustained 
Parkside's claim that the entry on the tax return was merely "inadvertent." See 571 F.2d 
at 1096-97. 
75. See Simmons & O'Hara, Three New Tests Appear for Obtaining Capital Gains 
on Heal Estate Sales, 28 J. TAX. 218 (1968). 
76. See Kent Indus. Corp., 25 T.C. 215, 218-19 (1955); Webster Corp., 25 T.C. 55, 
60-61 (1955), aff'd, 240 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1957); West End Co., 23 T.C. 815, 819-20 (1955). 
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1221(1) pertains to a broader category of assets than section 
543(b)(3), a court could choose criteria from section 1221(1) cases 
to construe section 543(b)(3) that may include factors not rele- 
vant in evaluating whether a corporation has been sufficiently 
involved in real estate sales activities to be classified as a busi- 
ness. Thus, there may be appropriate objections to an unmodified 
application of section 1221 (1) to section 543(b) (3). 
IV. STATUTORY REVISION 
Although temporary relief from the oppressive personal hold- 
ing company tax may be afforded real estate leasing companies 
through the application of section 1221(1) criteria to section 
543(b)(3), the continued use of this approach may only create 
additional uncertainties in this already complex area of taxation. 
On the other hand, if the personal holding company provisions 
are to be mechanically applied, the mechanism should be ad- 
justed and refined so that the tax is levied only on corporations 
that are clearly passive or designed to avoid surtaxes on individu- 
als. This ultimate relief must come from Congress. 
A. Deficiencies in the Present Personal Holding Company 
Provisions 
The exceptions to personal holding company status tend to 
be tailored and narrow in scope since most have been granted 
after business and industry protest. Three of these exceptions are 
relevant to an analysis of troubled real estate companies, and 
include the exception for real estate leasing companies with large 
rental income,77 the exception for companies that principally sell 
real estate,7R and the exception granted certain finance or lending 
cornpanie~.~~ A problem arises when a company that clearly falls 
within the first exception is forced to sell its property. After the 
sales, the company probably appears most similar to a lending or 
finance company because it will be forced to manage debts and 
collect an extensive amount of interest. Yet, because of the strin- 
gent requirements of the third limited exception, the company 
may not qualify. Thus, the company can only be extricated from 
The Tax Court in Parkside followed this approach by noting the "overall picture" of 
Parkside to show that this situation was a liquidation of inherited property. 34 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 59. 
77. I.R.C. fj 543(a)(2) provides this exception by excluding rental income when it is 
more than 50% of the adjusted ordinary gross income. 
78. See I.R.C. 4 543(a)(2), (b)(3). 
79. See I.R.C. 4 542(c)(6), (d). 
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personal holding company status by fitting in the second cate- 
gory. Some stretching of the language of the second exception is 
required in order to find that a company that previously only 
leased and rented property now sells the property in the ordinary 
course of business. The availability of section 1221(1) for stretch- 
ing the language has, therefore, not been unnoticed. 
In Parkside, the corporations shifted from the first exception 
to a position actually closer to the third-finance and lending 
companies. The gradual change of Parkside from a rental com- 
pany to a finance company was accompanied by a change in the 
type of income received after the duplexes were sold. While the 
monthly income Parkside received for the duplexes sold on in- 
stallment contracts may have been nearly equal to the rental 
payments i t  had received prior to the sales, the label of the 
company's income shifted from rental income to debt payments. 
The activities of Parkside's president also illustrate how the char- 
acter of the company shifted slightly from a rental business to 
include the services of a lending or finance company. The presi- 
dent associated with mortgage officers and members of financial 
institutions to stay abreast of developments and possible loan 
sources, kept close financial record of payments to Parkside, 
studied the Wall Street Journal along with various government 
and private financial publications and statistics, and continued 
to offer services to the duplex purchasers as a consultant to assist 
them in their other purchases." Although Parkside resembled a 
finance company, the Ninth Circuit employed section 1221(1) 
criteria to characterize Parkside as a company doing business 
within the second exception. 
The court implicitly recognized that the personal holding 
company exceptions and the policies supporting them do not 
clearly manifest an intent to tax real estate leasing companies 
forced to liquidate holdings and receive interest on debts due to 
market inactivity. Most leasing companies forced to liquidate 
desire to retain their corporate identity and established good will 
in hopes of returning to the rental business when a better rental 
market returns. In Parkside, for example, it may have been neces- 
sary to retain corporate status to avoid personal liability of the 
shareholders because the corporation was still liable on the origi- 
nal mortgages for the duplexes sold? 
Thus, a major deficiency with the personal holding company 
provisions in the real estate leasing area is that the legislative 
80. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 57-58. 
81. Id. at 58. 
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intent to exempt certain classes of companies has been unduly 
limited. Recessive market forces may cause an active real estate 
leasing company to fall outside the limited boundaries of one 
exception and assume characteristics similar to active companies 
within the other excepted categories. Yet, the company usually 
will not be able to meet the technical qualifications of the other 
personal holding company exceptions. 
Another major deficiency of the personal holding company 
tax is that it reaches many closely held corporations even though 
the shareholders are not wealthy individuals seeking to avoid the 
personal income tax. The seventy-percent personal holding com- 
pany tax is equal to the highest tax levied on individual income.x2 
This is consistent with the rationale of the personal holding com- 
pany provisions; the provisions tax corporations created by 
wealthy individuals to improperly avoid the highest levels of the 
individual income tax. This rationale, however, does not support 
the Tax Court's finding in Parkside. During the years in question, 
Parkside's president averaged an annual salary of approximately 
$7,000,A a salary comparable to that received by janitors, watch- 
men, and guards in the same area a t  that time.u4 Ironically, a tax 
once aimed at wealthy individuals who amassed millions of dol- 
lars in the 1920's can now be employed to reach individuals re- 
ceiving $7,000 from a small, debt-ridden corporation. 
B. Revision of See tion 543(b)(3) 
1. Shifting the emphasis 
Without attempting a massive restructuring of section 
513(b)(3), operating companies with rental and interest income 
could be appropriately protected from personal holding company 
status through a change in the wording of the section. By deleting 
"primarily?' and adding "active," the adjusted income from rents 
would include 
interest on debts owed to the corporation, to the extent such 
debts represent the price for which real property held primwihy 
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of an active trade 
or business was. sold or exchanged by the corporation . . . . 
Under this proposed statute, the emphasis would shift from de- 
termining whether the property is held primarily for sale, to iden- 
82. See I.R.C. 8 1. 
83. The president's annual salary in 1966, 1967, and 1968 was $6,300, $7,300, and 
$7,200, respectively. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 57, 61. 
84. Id. at 57. 
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tifying legitimately operating businesses. In interpreting section 
1221(1) courts have normally concentrated on whether property 
is held primarily for sale? This detracts from focusing on the 
nature of the corporation, which is a more appropriate basis for 
analysis under section 543(b) (3). 
The Supreme Court has held that "primarily" as used in 
section 1221(1) means "of first importance" or "prin~ipally."~"f 
this word were deleted," decreased emphasis would be placed on 
whether the property was held in the ordinary course of a business 
since at the same time the property could be held for other signifi- 
cant purposes. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Parkside in effect 
decreased the importance of "primarily" by limiting its applica- 
tion to "the relevant tax years."nx Obviously, during the years of 
the sales or immediately thereafter the court could easily find 
that  the property was held primarily for sale. Deletion of 
"primarily" from section 543(b)(3) similarly would direct focus 
away from the holding of the asset and toward the nature of the 
corporation. 
2. Drawing from other sections of the Code: The active business 
criterion 
The addition of "active" to section 543(b)(3) would empha- 
size the type of business to be excluded from classification as a 
personal holding company. The requirement of an active trade or 
business for favorable tax treatment has been employed in other 
sections of the Code and could be appropriately used in section 
543(b)(3). The foreign personal holding company provisions em- 
ploy this criterion and exclude rents "derived in the active con- 
duct of a trade or business"" from foreign personal holding com- 
pany income. The rents are treated as receipts from an active 
business when the lessor has produced, acquired, or substantially 
added to the real estate; participated in active and substantial 
management and operational functions related to the real estate; 
85. One recent case that emphasized the manner in which the property was held is 
Jersey Land & Dev. Corp. v. United States, 539 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1976). "[Ilt is the 
taxpayer's primary purpose in holding that property a t  the time of sale which determines 
whether the gain therefrom will qualify as capital gains or be taxed as ordinary income." 
Id. at 315 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit in Parkside took the same approach. 571 
F.2d at 1096. 
86. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U S .  569, 572 (1966). 
87. See Bernstein, "Primarily for Sale": A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1093 
(1968). This article discusses the undesirable effect Malat had on 5 1221(1) case law and 
suggests legislative elimination of "primarily" to remedy this effect. 
88. 571 F.2d at  1096. 
89. I.R.C. (i 954(c)(3)(A). 
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or rented the property only because it is temporarily idle in his 
normally active trade or business.g0 Other provisions for foreign 
personal holding companies exclude certain forms of interest 
when received through an active business.g1 
Section 355(b), in the setting of divisive corporate reorgani- 
zations, attempts to distinguish "the active conduct of a trade or 
business" from the passive conduct of a business. One important 
test employed in this section is whether the business has been 
actively conducted for the past five yeamg2 A determination is 
also made whether the corporation is presently engaged in active 
busine~s.~" 
The "downright confis~atory"~~ personal holding company 
tax should not be arbitrarily exercised without regard to the sta- 
tus of the taxpayer as an active corporation. Present personal 
holding company provisions are the product of the vindictive 
surge of the 1930's to eliminate holding companies and tax avoid- 
ance corporations. The provisions are not the result of a moder- 
ate, carefully calculated analysis of the personal holding com- 
pany problem. 
The tax is particularly oppressive for real estate leasing com- 
panies forced to liquidate as a result of a depressed market econ- 
omy. In Parkside v. Commissioner, the court used the extensively 
litigated, yet flexible criteria of section 1221(1) to rescue the cor- 
porations. Today, the personal holding company mechanism 
needs refinement and consistency to avoid sweeping innocent cor- 
porations within its grasp. Modification of the personal holding 
company mechanism, by changing section 543(b)(3) so that the 
major determination would be whether the company can be con- 
sidered active would noticeably improve its application. 
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